Trade in services in the Asia Pacific region by Lee, Nae-Chan & Lie, Han-Young
This PDF is a selection from a published volume from the
National Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: Trade in Services in the Asia Pacific Region,
NBER East Asia Seminar on Economics (EASE), Volume
11
Volume Author/Editor: Takatoshi Ito and Anne O. Krueger,
editors
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-38677-5
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/ito_03-1
Conference Date: June 22-24, 2000
Publication Date: January 2003
Title: Korea’s Telecom Services Reform through Trade Negotiations




It has become a fairly common assertion that deregulation in the tele-
communication services market around the world has been a clear trend
since a couple of decades ago. Obviously, regulatory reform has been legit-
imized with the beginning of a multilateral governmental response to the
Uruguay Round and World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations on ba-
sic telecommunications. The backgrounds and key factors of deregulation
markedly diﬀer across the majority of countries according to diﬀerent pol-
icy objectives, so that no single country can be held up as a model case of
successful deregulation. Nevertheless, all agree that the objective of dereg-
ulation is to improve social welfare by attaining lower service tariﬀs, higher
service quality, and greater eﬃciency in the market.
Korea has been actively working on deregulating in its telecommunica-
tion services market since the 1990s, after it provided basic telephony to the
general public in the 1980s. Recognizing the importance of eﬀective com-
petition for the future growth of its telecommunication services market, the
Korean government, acting as policy maker, regulator, and largest stake-
holder of the dominant service provider Korea Telecom, has played a cen-
tral role in restructuring the market. It has established the rules of the game
on one hand and has controlled the outcomes of it on the other hand. Al-
though less identified, but of great importance for better understanding the
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motivation and process of Korea’s deregulation, is the pressure for market
opening that has originated from trade negotiations. In particular, WTO
negotiations on basic telecommunications have become a watershed for
furthering deregulation and accelerating competition in the market.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the implications and lessons of
regulatory reform in Korea’s telecommunication services market. The next
section (section 8.2) reviews the history of the deregulation process. It ex-
plains how Korea has been transforming the market since 1990 by taking
advantage of the opportunities given by trade negotiations. This is followed
in section 8.3 by an overview of the current marketplace. Section 8.4 ex-
plores the impact of the most recent regulatory reforms made in conjunc-
tion with WTO negotiations on basic telecommunications on market per-
formance with respect to contestability and competition. We especially
focus on the implication of introducing voice resale services into the market
and the role of foreign investment in facilitating competition in the mobile-
services market. Finally, section 8.5 oﬀers concluding remarks. 
8.2 Impact of Trade Negotiations on the Korea’s Regulation
Korea has made significant progress in the deregulation of the telecom-
munication services market since 1990. As a result, it has succeeded in en-
hancing the overall performance of the market through the promotion of
competition. It is natural that adequate credit be given to the government’s
determination in and eﬀorts toward attaining such progress. In a sense,
however, the success of deregulation appears to be a legacy of a series of bi-
lateral and multilateral trade negotiations on telecommunications services.
Trade negotiations at least provided good momentum for Korean policy
makers to eﬀectively manage domestic pressure against opening the mar-
ket. In the following sections, we examine the development of the Korean
regulatory regime in the 1990s with due attention to the trade negotiations
in which Korea has been involved.
8.2.1 The First Stage (mid-1990–mid-1994)
The Korean telecommunication services market in the 1980s was char-
acterized by the construction of the Public Switched Telecommunication
Network (PSTN). Extremely low teledensity was a chronic problem during
those days, so the top policy priority was simply to satisfy the basic needs of
the general public for telephone services. The Korea Telecommunications
Authority—predecessor of today’s Korea Telecom (KT, henceforth)—was
exclusively in charge of providing telephone services under the auspices of
the Korean government. By 1988, it had barely managed to attain the pol-
icy objective of providing a telephone per household. With the basic de-
mand satisfied, the Korean government began to concentrate on other is-
sues such as quality improvement for telecommunication services and the
enhancement of KT’s managerial eﬃciency.
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In February 1989, a year after Korea managed to satisfy the basic de-
mand for telephone services, the United States designated Korea as a pri-
ority foreign country (PFC) based on Section 1374 of the Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act of 1988.1 The purpose of this designation was to
open up Korea’s telecommunication services market, especially to value-
added and mobile services. In addition, the liberalization of the value-
added services market was a major negotiation agenda of the Uruguay
Round (UR). The Korean government, after a series of bilateral talks with
the United States, decided to carry out structural reform of the existing
market in July 1990.
It was clear that the U.S. action provided Korea with a direct motivation
for both market liberalization and regulatory policy making at the same
time. In the reform process, Korea incorporated the U.S. request to elimi-
nate market access limitations (i.e., to permit foreign ownership in the
value-added and mobile services segments). However, Korea kept its own
stance in streamlining other regulatory policies such as categorizing service
providers and applying market entry conditions to each category of service
provider.
A key feature of the reform was to divide service providers into three cat-
egories: general, specific, and value-added (see table 8.1).2 General and spe-
cific service providers were diﬀerentiated from the value-added by virtue of
having their own facilities. The business area of general service providers
was wired services, whereas that of specific service providers was confined
to wireless services. The requirements for market entry were also diﬀerent:
for the general service providers it was the government’s designation; for the
special service providers, licensing; and for the value-added service pro-
viders, registration. Although foreign ownership was not allowed among
general service providers, it was allowed up to 30 percent among special
and up to 100 percent among value-added.
The diﬀerentiation of entry barriers among the service providers can be
interpreted as a strategy to treat foreign entry diﬀerently according to the
degree of pressure for market opening. Korea could resolve the external is-
sues by fully opening the value-added services market and part of the mo-
bile market. Classification of the service providers was useful from the reg-
ulatory perspectives, but it entailed a lot of loopholes. In particular, sticking
points were the positive listing system for the provision of services and the
request for proposal (RFP) system for licensing. Through the positive list-
ing system, the government permitted the service providers to supply only
the services listed in the Telecommunications Business Act. It took a long
Korea’s Telecom Services Reform through Trade Negotiations 245
1. Section 1374 entitles the USTR to investigate potential foreign telecommunications trade
barriers, identify any trading partner with anticompetitive practices as a priority foreign coun-
try, and at any time revoke the identification (taking into account relevant criteria, including
progress being made).
2. Before 1990, the only category of the telecommunications service providers in Korea was
that of the public telecommunications operators (PTOs).
administrative rationing process for the unlisted services to be introduced
into the market, which deterred the introduction of new services. Under the
RFP system, a company could make a request for a license only on the con-
dition that the government made public notification prior to licensing. The
Korean government retained the RFP system until August 1997 as an im-
portant policy tool to set a priori limitation on the number of market en-
trants into any of the service categories.3
After the first reform, duopoly competition for international telephone
and regional radio paging service segments was introduced. Competition,
however, was managed by government intervention through a prior tariﬀ
approval system. Price diﬀerentials between incumbent and new entrants
were kept constant at a level at which the entrants could secure their market
shares without being so drastic as to tip the balance too unfavorably toward
incumbents.4 This managed competition systematically guaranteed exces-
sive profits to all of the service providers once they obtained their entry
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Table 8.1 Classification of Service Providers in the First Reform (mid-1990–mid-1994)
General Specific Value-Added 
Category Service Provider Service Provider Service Provider
Facilities Own facilities Own facilities Leased facilities
Subservices Fixed telephony, tele- Wireless services: cellular, Database, data pro-
graph, telegram, private radio paging, TRS, wire- cessing, data accumula-
leased circuits less data transmission tion and transmission, 
EDI, e-mail, CRS
Market entry Designation Licensing Registration
condition
Foreign Not allowed Up to 1/3 of the total Up to 100%
ownership shares (not allowed to be 
the largest shareholder)
Other regulations The largest shareholder: The largest shareholder: None
on ownership up to 10% up to 1/3 of the total 
Equipment manufacturer: shares
up to 3% Equipment manufacturer: 
up to 1/3 of the total 
shares (not allowed to be 
the largest shareholder)
Government invested 
institution: up to 10% 
(not allowed to be the 
largest shareholder)
Source: Ministry of Information and Communication.
3. This is one of the typical limitations to market access, the so-called, economic needs test
that is specified in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), article 16.
4. Under the prior tariﬀ approval system, even the entrant without market power, not to
speak of the incumbent, has no autonomy to determine its own tariﬀs. The system was abol-
ished in late 1995.
ticket, but blurred the original policy objective: enforcement of service pro-
viders’ competitiveness through competition.
8.2.2 The Second Reform (mid-1994–mid-1997)
The Korean government had maintained the position, ever since the first
reform, that it could manage the telecommunications market structure at
will. However, in December 1993 when the UR was concluded, the govern-
ment realized that its policy stance could not last long. Because it had found
basic telecommunications to be one of the service sectors left unresolved by
the UR, trading partners agreed to extend the period of negotiations on ba-
sic telecommunications until 30 April 1996. The government regarded this
situation as a strong message that the existing telecommunication services
regime would be radically liberalized sooner or later. Therefore, competi-
tion became mandatory for the Korean telecommunication services mar-
ket, which led to the second structural reform of July 1994.
One of the major regulatory changes made in the second reform was the
scrapping of the demarcation between general and specific service providers,
which were integrated and dubbed facility-based service providers (FSPs,
henceforth). The other change was the adoption of the negative listing sys-
tem. As a result, a company licensed to provide facility-based services was
legally able to supply any service. In practice, the government still listed the
facility-based services in the Telecommunications Business Act, so that FSPs
were under regulation in the process of licensing. However, it was a significant
improvement because value-added service providers were allowed to supply
all types of services except facility-based services. As regards the foreign own-
ership restrictions, the restriction on telecommunications equipment manu-
facturers’ ownership in facility-based services was abolished so that they
could participate in those services on an equal footing.5 Table 8.2 summarizes
the classification of service providers resulting from the second reform.
The second reform, through the introduction of competition into long-
distance service,6 set up a duopoly structure externally in every licensed
facility-based services market. However, because the RFP system in licens-
ing served as a major stumbling block to inducing additional entry in
the market, it was not possible to reap the fruits of competition. Asymmet-
ric entry barriers also existed between fixed and mobile services, due to the
ownership restriction on the largest shareholder in fixed telephony. While
the former general service providers could enter the mobile services market
without ownership adjustment, the former specific service providers, par-
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5. Additionally, the ownership limitation on the private leased circuits services—which had
been kept tight since the first reform by treating the services as a specific service on the basis
of the former classification—was mitigated. Therefore, foreigners formerly prohibited from in-
vestment could come to invest up to one third of the total shares.
6. The Korean government designated Dacom as the second long-distance service provider
in March 1995.
ticularly mobile service providers with the largest shareholdings, were
obliged to reduce their ownership in order to enter the fixed telephony mar-
ket. That is to say, there was an asymmetric line of business.
In sum, structural reform in the Korean telecommunication services
market was successful to some extent in increasing the number of partici-
pants in the market, but not in facilitating the level playing field to enhance
the eﬀective competition. However, the practice of managed competition
had been continued on the basis of providing appropriate competition in
the market, as had been intended at the first stage.
In July 1995, the government announced a blueprint to promote com-
petitiveness in telecommunication services.7 The main purpose was to es-
tablish fair and eﬀective competition in the market, which can be consid-
ered a switchover in the policy direction from a managed and progressive
competition to a free and full-scale competition.8 The first step of the action
plan was to facilitate the introduction of new service providers in interna-
tional telephone services, private leased circuits, and various mobile ser-
vices. The second was to streamline a wide range of existing regulatory mea-
sures, including the removal of the RFP system and the reinforcement of an
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Table 8.2 Classification of Service Providers in the Second Reform (mid-1994–mid-1997)
Category Facility-Based Service Provider Value-Added Service Provider
Facilities Own facilities Leased facilities
Subservices Fixed telephony, telegraph, telegram, Other than those provided by facility-
private leased circuits, wireless services based service providers
(cellular, radio paging, wireless data 
transmission, TRS), and other services 
specified by the minister
Market entry Licensing Notification
condition
Foreign ownership Wired line: prohibited Up to 100%
Wireless: up to 1/3 of the total shares 
(not allowed to be the largest share-
holder)
Other regulations Wired line: up to 10% for the largest None
on ownership shareholder
Government invested institution: up to 
10% (not allowed to be the largest 
shareholder)
Source: Ministry of Information and Communication.
7. From a political point of view, the announcement of the blueprint might be interpreted as
a bandwagon attempt of the newly launched Ministry of Information and Communication
(MIC) in December 1994 (the successor of Ministry of Communications [MOC]).
8. Another purpose was to provide KT with greater managerial independence by overhaul-
ing existing regulations arising from its status as a government-invested institution, and by per-
mitting participation in the new service markets (such as the mobile market).
independent regulatory body’s role.9 The third was to extend the scope of
competition from domestic to international based on the outcomes of the
WTO negotiations on basic telecommunications.
At the end of 1995, the government changed its stance dramatically on
the regulation of prices by abolishing the prior approval system, under
which it had approved all tariﬀs except local telephony of KT and mobile
services of SK telecom, because the two service providers were regarded as
assuming market power in each market.10 As a result, most service provid-
ers gained the autonomy to determine their own tariﬀs, so that a notifica-
tion alone was enough for any changes in tariﬀs.
8.2.3 The Third Stage (mid-1997–)
WTO Negotiations
As an initial step toward full-scale competition, the government issued
licenses to twenty seven new service providers in 1996 in such services as in-
ternational telephone (one as the third-service provider), private leased cir-
cuits (two), personal communications services (PCS; three), trunked radio
services (TRS; six), radio paging (one), wireless data transmission (three),
and second generation cordless telephony (CT-2; eleven). It was not un-
til a few months after the conclusion of the WTO negotiations that the
government took practical and legal actions for the other regulatory im-
provements planned in the blueprint. The WTO negotiations on basic tele-
communications, after a long series of the consultations, reached its final
conclusion on 15 February 1997, with the agreement going into force on
5 February 1998. The main achievements comprised a wide range of bind-
ing commitments on market access and a package of procompetitive regu-
latory principles (the so-called Reference Paper).11
Korea made its final commitments on market access for all segments in
telecommunication services on 14 February 1997. Foreign ownership was
limited to 33 percent in facility-based services by the end of 2000, and was to
be raised to 49 percent beginning 1 January 2001. For individual sharehold-
ings, it was limited to 10 percent for wired line services and 33 percent for
wireless, respectively.12 Foreign ownership in KT was limited to 20 percent
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9. The Korea Communications Commission (KCC) was originally created as a regulatory
body in March 1992. However, being under the auspices of the MIC, KCC played a limited role
in regulatory functioning.
10. The Korean government is further considering the introduction into the local telephony
of a price-cap system, which is believed to be better than the prior approval system in facili-
tating cost-oriented pricing and in improving eﬃciency in the market. In addition, the price-
cap system seems advantageous in that it is not subject to non–sector specific consideration
and political interference.
11. For details, see Sherman (1998).
12. Limitation on individual shareholdings applied to both domestic and foreign persons in
a nondiscriminatory manner.
by the end of 2000, and to be raised to 33 percent beginning 1 January 2001,
with individual shareholdings limited to 3 percent.13 In telephone services on
a resale basis (so-called voice resale), foreign ownership was allowed up to
49 percent on 1 January 1999, and was to be raised to 100 percent beginning
1 January 2001.14 Korea also included in its schedule additional commit-
ments to underpin those on market access by adopting the Reference Paper.
Table 8.3 summarizes Korea’s telecommunication market regulations before
and after the WTO negotiations on basic telecommunications, and table 8.4
shows the classifications of service providers resulting from the third reform.
Korea’s schedule could be considered insuﬃcient in that it basically
phased-in liberalization without allowing foreigners’ majority sharehold-
ings in facility-based services, including KT. Nonetheless, it was a signifi-
cant improvement not only for Korea but also for other trading partners.
Aside from its mitigation of foreign ownership restrictions, it was a clear de-
parture from the status quo of the telecommunication services market, par-
ticularly in two respects. One was the elimination of the RFP system, which
had been a major obstacle to free and full-scale competition in (and a defi-
nite limitation on foreign-market access to) the Korean market.15
The other enhancement was the introduction and, at the same time, the
liberalization of voice resale. Its implication was that the Korean govern-
ment would systematically induce price competition between the existing
FSPs and the newly participating special service providers (SSPs) within
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13. It was not permitted for a foreigner to be the largest shareholder in KT.
14. Foreign ownership in the other resale-based services was allowed up to 100 percent as of
1998.
15. It is still legitimate for any government to limit the number of service providers subject
to the availability of radio frequencies, in accordance with the consensus made in the WTO ne-
gotiations on basic telecommunications.
Table 8.3 Summary of Korea’s Existing Regulations and Scheduled Commitments 
(as of February 1998)
Category Existing Entry Barriers Scheduled Commitments
Facility-based Aggregate: Aggregate:
services Wired line: prohibited; wireless: 33%; Wired line: 33%, 49% from 2001; wire-
KT: prohibited less: 33%, 49% from 2001; KT: 20%, 
33% from 2001
Individual: Individual:
Wired line: 10%; wireless: 33%; KT: 1% Wired line: 10%; wireless: 33%; KT: 3%
Voice resale Aggregate: Aggregate:
services Prohibited 49% from 1999; 100% from 2001




the market. It was also a major advancement for Korea to bind itself in ful-
filling its regulatory functions through adopting the multilateral obligations
of the Reference Paper.
Korea embarked on a third structural reform after the conclusion of the
WTO negotiations on basic telecommunications. The motivation was
largely twofold: one was to saturate the market with as many domestic pro-
viders as possible before the market opening, and the other was to make its
laws and regulations conform with the scheduled commitments. In June
1997, the government selected nine new service providers in five service ar-
eas such as local, long-distance, private leased circuits, radio paging, and
TRS. The meaning of the action was considerably symbolic in Korea, since
competition was introduced even in the local service market, which had
been exclusively dominated by KT. That was little more than the comple-
tion of introducing competition in all segments of the Korean telecommu-
nication services market.
Autonomous Deregulation
The regulatory regime experienced a significant change in August 1997 in
accordance with the amendment of the Telecommunications Business Act.
Korea’s Telecom Services Reform through Trade Negotiations 251
Table 8.4 Classification of Service Providers in the Third Reform (as of February 1998)
Facilities-Based Value-Added
Category Service Providers Special Service Providers Service Providers
Facilities Own facilities Leased facilities Leased facilities
Subservices Fixed telephony, tele- Type I (switched reseller): All value-added telecom-
graph, telegram, private Voice resale, IP-based munication services
leased circuits, mobile telephony, international 
services, and other call-back, etc. 
services specified by the Type II 
minister (switchless reseller):
Aggregator, rebiller, etc. 
Type III: in-building:
Communication services
Market entry Licensing Registration Notification
condition
Foreign Aggregate: Aggregate: Up to 100%
ownership Wired line: 33%, 49% 49% from 1999; 100% 
from 2001; wireless: 33%, from 2001
49% from 2001; KT: 20%, 
33% from 2001 (prohibi-
tion of foreign largest 
shareholding)
Other regulations Individual: None None
on ownership Wired line: 10%; wireless:
33%; KT: 3%
Source: Ministry of Information and Communication.
Aside from the mitigation of foreign ownership restrictions and the elimi-
nation of RFP,16 one of the most important changes occurred in the classi-
fication of service providers. According to the commitments made in the
WTO agreement on basic telecommunications, the government newly in-
troduced a category of resale-based services in licensing—so-called special
services—most of which had never before been legally permitted in Korea.
The category was created by a simple decomposition of the former FSPs in
the second reform, on the basis of the existence of own facilities and the
type of services for provision. The method of classification in Korea be-
came similar to methods in other developed countries. Service providers
were classified as facility-based, special, or value-added service providers.
They were diﬀerentiated by the respective market entry conditions: licens-
ing for facility-based service providers, registration for special service pro-
viders, and notification for value-added service providers. (Figure 8.1 shows
how the market entry conditions were deregulated.)
Meanwhile, Korea undertook an autonomous liberalization in 1998 and
1999 to facilitate the inflow of foreign capital, the better to cope with its late-
1997–98 financial crisis. In accordance with the revision of the Telecom-
munications Business Law on 17 September 1998, Korea accelerated the
removal of other ownership restrictions. The limitation on the foreign
ownership of KT was raised from 20 percent to 33 percent as of 17 Sep-
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16. Nonetheless, the government still has room to improve in that it files license applications
only on a periodic basis in March and September. The reason is that the periodic licensing it-
self imposes a limitation to seasonable market entry.
Fig. 8.1 Deregulation of market entry condition
tember 1998 (the previous date had been 1 January 2001). A 33 percent (10
percent, in the case of wired line services) limitation on individual share-
holding for a facility-based service supplier, except KT, was removed as of
17 September 1998. The foreign ownership of a supplier of voice resale ser-
vices was permitted up to 49 percent as of the same date—which was earlier
than the previously scheduled time of 1 January 1999. Furthermore, the lim-
itation on individual shareholdings in KT was expanded from 3 percent to
15 percent as of 1 January 1999. With another revision of the law on 24 May
1999, the limitation on foreign ownership of a facility-based service supplier
(except KT) was expanded from 33 percent to 49 percent as of 1 July 1999
(as opposed to the previously scheduled date of 1 January 2001). Table 8.5
summarizes the present state of foreign ownership regulations in Korea.
Competitive Safeguards
It is often said that market entry regulation is justified when the scarce re-
source of the frequency spectrum should be allocated in an eﬃcient way for
wireless services, when economies of scale or scope prevail, and when in-
eﬃcient duplication of investment may be precluded.
There are several competitive safeguards in Korea for ensuring fair
competition between incumbent and new entrants once market entry is ac-
complished, and for the protection of consumer rights such as interconnec-
tion, preselection, telecommunications performance monitoring systems
(TPMS), merger and acquisition guidelines, and a universal service fund
(see OECD 2000).
Korea Telecom, as an owner of bottleneck facilities such as local loops,
is obligated to the mandatory and prompt provision of interconnection,
cost-orientation through rate-of-return regulation, and separate account-
ing. As of 2000, the scheme was extended to mobile FSPs—including SK
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Table 8.5 Current Status in Foreign Ownership Regulations (as of April 2000)
Facility-Based Special Value-Added
Category Service Providers Providers Service Providers
Foreign Aggregate: Aggregate: Up to 100%
ownership Wired line: 49% as from 49% as from September 
July 1999; wireless: 49% 1998; 100% as from 2001
as from July 1999; KT: 
33% as from September 
1998 (prohibition of 
foreign largest share-
holding)
Other regulations on Individual: None None
ownership KT: 15% as from 
January 1999
Source: Ministry of Information and Communication.
Telecom—because of the increasing importance of mobile services and in-
creasing interaction between fixed and mobile networks. Preselection guar-
antees parity in dialing among long-distance FSPs by allowing users to
choose in advance which FSP’s service to use. It was first applied in 1997 to
Dacom and extended to Onse in 1999. For the purpose of providing users
with information about FSPs’ quality of services (QoS) and inducing qual-
ity competition among FSPs, the government introduced TPMS in 1999, by
which several QoS indicators of fixed and mobile services are announced
periodically. The scheme was extended to high-bandwidth Internet services
including accelerated digital subscriber lines (ADSL) and cable modem in
2000. Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) among FSPs in the telecommuni-
cations market are under the auspices of the Ministry of Information and
Communication (MIC) and the Korea Federal Trade Commission, which
perform separate roles through the M&A guidelines for testing would-be
anticompetitive eﬀects of M&A. In addition, a universal service fund to
make up for deficits generated from local charges below costs was scheduled
to be implemented in 2000.
8.3 Snapshot of Korea’s Recent Marketplace
As outlined in section 8.2, harnessed mainly by trade negotiations, the Ko-
rean government has enforced step-by-step regulatory reforms to dismantle
unnecessary obstacles, especially market entry barriers that deter vigorous
market competition. Through a series of deregulation processes, Korea’s
telecommunication services market has achieved unprecedented growth.
This chapter reviews the status quo and dynamics of the marketplace.
8.3.1 Market Participants
The variety of services and the number of market participants are one of
the significant barometers for measuring a degree of competition. As of
April 2000, 52 FSPs and 229 SSPs were operating businesses in each rele-
vant service market, whereas the value-added service providers totalled
3,729.17 There are nine major facility-based telecommunication services, in-
cluding traditional fixed telephony and wireless services. KT, Dacom, and
Onse are three major players in long-distance and international service
markets, whereas most Type I SSPs have been doing business in the wireless
sector ever since voice resale service was permitted in 1998. In April 1999
Hanaro, focusing mainly on the deployment of ADSL for high-bandwidth
Internet services, launched its business in the last ten miles of local loops
that have long been regarded as an impregnable fortress of KT. Eleven FSPs
are operating in the leased-line market. Table 8.6 lists the numbers of FSPs
and SSPs as of April 2000.
The mobile service market consists of five competitors: two cellular pro-
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17. Diﬀerent services of the same FSPs and SSPs are double-counted.
viders (incumbent SK Telecom and Shinsegi Telecom) and three PCS pro-
viders (KT Freetel, LG Telecom, and Hansol M.Com). A nationwide ra-
dio paging FSP, SK Telecom competes with thirteen regional FSPs in the
radio paging service market. Three providers are in the wireless data trans-
mission service market and eleven in the TRS market, where they are in in-
fancy, but about to burgeon.
8.3.2 Subscribers
As of February 2000, the number of fixed telephony subscribers exceeded
21 million and of mobile subscribers amounted to 25 million. KT remains
dominant in the fixed service market, whereas the market share of new en-
trant Hanaro, in its infancy, is less than 1 percent. In the mobile service mar-
ket, the leading FSP—SK Telecom—accounted for 42.8 percent of the to-
tal number of mobile subscribers, whereas the share of Shinsegi Telecom
amounted to 13.8 percent. The remaining 43.4 percent belongs to three PCS
providers.
The high penetration ratio of fixed telephony service is mainly due to the
government’s eﬀort to expand the PSTN infrastructures by means of tele-
graph and telephone bond, and to maintain local-call charges below costs in
the context of the general public interest by prior tariﬀ approval systems.
Teledensity presently exceeds 50 percent and seems to be reaching a satura-
tion point. In contrast to the fixed telephony market, the growth of the mo-
bile service market has been propelled solely by commercial motives. Ever-
diminishing purchase costs of terminal equipment removed entry barriers
for customers and accelerated the increase in the number of mobile sub-
scribers exponentially. As of June 1999, the number of mobile subscribers
per 100 inhabitants ranked fifth among OECD member countries and sur-
passed the number of fixed service subscribers in September 1999. The num-
ber of mobile subscribers was expected to grow to 29 million by late 2000.18
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Table 8.6 Number of FSPs and SSPs (as of April 2000)
Wired Wireless
Long Leased Radio Wireless Data 
Local Distance International Line Cellular PCS Paging Transmission TRS
Number of
service areas 2 3 3 11 2 3 14 3 11
Type I Type II Type III
Number of classifications of SSPs 30 177 22
Source: Ministry of Information and Communication.
18. The quadratic logistic function is applied to estimate the value. The saturation ratio is as-
sumed to be 65 percent and monthly data from January 1996 to December 1999 are used.
Competition among mobile FSPs for leftover subscribers (consisting mainly
of teenagers or individuals in their twenties) is still going on fiercely with the
goal of preserving as many customers as possible, aiming at IMT-2000 li-
censes that were scheduled to be granted in late December 2000.
On the other hand, the number of users of radio paging services reached
an apex of 15 million in late 1997, but have been drastically declining since
then, and were fewer than 3 million in January 2000. As a result of market
shrinkage, origination-only CT-2 service, formerly provided by the nation-
wide service provider KT and ten regional FSPs, was shut down in January
2000.
Table 8.7 and figure 8.2 summarize the numbers of subscribers in the Ko-
rean telecommunication services market.
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Table 8.7 Number and Shares of Subscribers (as of February 2000)
FSP Korea Telecom Hanaro Total
Fixed subscriber 
(in millions) 21.43 0.19 21.62
M/S (%) 99.1 0.9 100.0
SK Shinsegi KT LG Hansol
Telecom Telecom Freetel Telecom M. Com Total
Mobile subscriber 
(in millions) 10.89 3.51 4.61 3.02 3.41 25.44
M/S (%) 42.8 13.8 18.1 11.9 13.4 100.0
Source: Ministry of Information and Communication.
Fig. 8.2 Number of major telecom service subscribers (millions)
Sources: Ministry of Information and Communication, mobile FSPs
8.3.3 Dynamics of the Marketplace
A significant feature of changes in trends in voice services markets is that
traditional fixed telephony services markets (including local, long-distance,
and international services) have been nearly saturated or have even shrunk,
whereas mobile service has grown by leaps and bounds. In 1999, the total
revenue for wired services amounted to 6,430 trillion won, and that of wire-
less services, 9,715 trillion won, adding up to 16,145 trillion won (see table
8.8). The mobile turnover caught up with traditional fixed telephony ser-
vices in 1999, proving that mobile services are no longer supplemental to
fixed telephony services.
The revenue of local services has increased annually by 1.1 percent, on
average, since 1996, and amounted to 3,078 billion won in 1999. In order to
guarantee universal access for the general public to local telephony services,
local-call charges have been maintained at the level below costs incurred.
The resulting deficits have been cross-subsidized by such surplus sectors as
long-distance and international sectors, which have brought about de facto
transfers of wealth from heavy users to light users. To address this unfair
practice, tariﬀ rebalancing has been executed eight times since 1981 and is
expected to continue. Nevertheless, considering that the subscriber market
appears to be saturated, with no potential for new demand-inducing pack-
ages, market expansion cannot be anticipated.
Worse still is the case of the long-distance service market. Its revenues
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Table 8.8 Revenues of Wired and Wireless Services (billions of won)
Service Area 1996 1997 1998 1999
Wired
Locala 2,984 3,049 3,072 3,078
Long distance 2,176 2,487 1,573 1,334
International 753 728 590 653
Public pay phone 613 260 502 327
Leased line 622 791 874 1,038
Subtotal (a) 7,148 7,315 6,611 6,430
Wireless
Mobilea 2,254 3,582 5,322 9,118
Paging 1,163 1,511 1,168 550
TRS 3.4 7.2 7.1 12.2
Wireless data 
transmission — 0.2 0.7 20.5
CT-2 — 52 43 14
Subtotal (b) 3,420 5,152 6,541 9,715
Total (a + b) 10,568 12,467 13,152 16,145
Source: Computer and Communication Promotion Association of Korea.
aRevenues include interconnection revenues.
recorded a peak in 1997, but steeply declined in 1998. It remained on the
wane in 1999, accounting for 1,334 billion won. A major reason for the
sharp drop was certainly the financial crisis, but what seems more impor-
tant is that demands for long-distance calls were satisfied by mobile calls.
Mobile FSPs, not diﬀerentiating services and tariﬀs by distance, can deliver
long-distance calls. Even though long-distance service is generally more
economical than mobile service for long conversations, customers appear
to prefer using mobile phones partly because they might not recognize this
fact, or partly because they are used to the convenience of mobility, result-
ing in a so-called ratchet eﬀect.
The trend of revenue in international services is similar to that in long-
distance service. Although the market size is the smallest of the three tradi-
tional fixed telephony services, the market mechanism, including the inter-
national settlement regime, is the most complicated, and is an exemplary
case in which positive eﬀects of liberalization have been manifested (as will
be analyzed in the next section in detail).19
The ups and downs of wireless markets, especially mobile and radio
paging service markets, reflect trends not only in the number of subscribers
but also in amount of revenue. The mobile market has continued to grow
from 5,322 billion won to 9,118 billion won in 1999, an increase of more
than 40 percent, whereas the radio paging market amounted to 550 billion
won in 1999, a 50 percent decrease from the previous year. Radio paging
services lost their price competitiveness with mobile services as costs of mo-
bile terminal equipment continued to decline and as the demand for such
services as VMS (voice mail service) and SMS (short messaging service)
gradually increased, blurring the line of business between them.
Several points in the changing trends are worth noticing. First, although
mobile services have grown enough to substitute for some portion of long-
distance services, they also have facilitated the expansion of LM (land-to-
mobile) calls out-bounding from KT’s network to mobile FSPs, to which no
one had seriously paid attention only a few years ago. The turnover of LM
service in 1999 amounted to 597 billion, twice as much as that of the previ-
ous year. Although the mobile-inducing eﬀect could also be observed in
public pay-phone service, the ratchet eﬀect of convenience for using mobile
service dominated it, resulting in deficits.20
Second, traditionally voice-oriented markets are shifting to datacentric
ones, which have an impact on leased line services and dial-up Internet in-
terconnection. The revenue of leased line services, quite a portion of which
comes from the demand of business customers for constructing intranets
and connecting them to the Internet, increased 18.6 percent a year on aver-
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19. Numeric values in the table do not contain international settlement deficits.
20. For more details on the interaction between fixed and mobile FSPs from the perspective
of the interconnection regime, see Lee (1999).
age and recorded 1,038 billion won in 1999.21 This number was also boosted
by the spread of so-called Internet plazas, which are furnished with per-
sonal computers providing services such as Internet access and computer
games to an unspecified number of users.22
On the other hand, residential customers use the dial-up method by which
they can connect with the Internet via KT’s local switches. A local-call charge
is then paid to KT in addition to a flat fee to an ISP (Internet service pro-
vider). As a result, some portion of the local service revenue includes dial-up
interconnection.23 There is a peculiar dial-up service in Korea called 014xy
service. This service was introduced by the government in 1994 to facilitate
the data services market with a 40 percent discount on local-call charges. For
ISPs to qualify as 014xy service providers and obtain identification numbers
they must have more than five nodes equipped with routers and relevant fa-
cilities nationwide. The increase in demand for data services is reflected in the
trend of 014xy revenue, which has nearly doubled annually and accounts for
242 billion won (see table 8.9 for a summary of LM and 014xy revenues, and
figure 8.3 for an illustration of how the various telecom services interact).
8.4 Triggering New Games
The liberalization and opening of Korea’s telecommunication services
market, spurred by a series of trade negotiations, has gradually evolved
through the deregulation of market-entry conditions and the mitigation of
the foreign ownership ceiling. However, the strongest impact on domestic
markets has been the WTO agreement on basic telecommunications. First,
it has facilitated contestability of the international service market by allow-
ing voice resellers to enter. Second, it has not only provided a foothold for
late-coming mobile FSPs to raise investment funds, thus enhancing com-
petition in the mobile sector, but has also accelerated the privatization of
KT by issuing foreign Depositary Receipts.
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21. Demands for the leased line also come from FSPs’ network construction, e.g., connec-
tions of mobile FSPs’ switches and base stations.
22. As of January 2000 the number of Internet plazas amounted to about 14,000.
23. Considering that local service revenue maintained the status quo, it might be guessed
that the revenue from pure voice use will be diminishing.
Table 8.9 Revenues of LM and 014xy Services (billions of won)
Service Area 1996 1997 1998 1999
LMa n.a. n.a. 1,386 2,510
014xy n.a. 71 122 242
Source: Korea Information Society Development Institute 1999, 2000.
























Competition in the Outgoing-Traﬃc Market: Realization of Contestability
Liberalization of the Voice Resale Market. By 1997, Korea’s international
telecommunications market had been operated by KT, Dacom, and Onse.
Since voice resale service was first introduced in January 1998 (pursuant to
the revised Telecommunications Business Law, which took in Korea’s regu-
latory commitments made in the WTO agreement), more than thirty Type-
I SSPs have entered the international services market.24
Type-I SSPs are either aﬃliates of incumbent FSPs experienced in tele-
communications businesses or spin-oﬀs of conglomerates beginning with
their large demand pool. SSPs either sell prepaid or postpaid cards with
individual access numbers, or provide international telephony services to an
unspecified number of the general public with identification numbers in the
form of 007xy or 003xy. SSPs’ services are provided mostly through mobile
FSPs’ networks and subscribers’ handsets.
Implications of Introducing Resale from the Perspective of Industrial Organi-
zations. Traditionally, the telecommunication services industry has been re-
garded as having economies of scale or scope and as prone to being mo-
nopolized, resulting in monopoly rents for the incumbent monopolist. It is
the conventional wisdom of the contestable market theory, however, that if
the market is flexible enough that potential entrants who possess the tech-
nology and who provide services as homogeneous as the incumbent’s can
freely enter all or part of market with lower tariﬀs than the incumbent’s
whenever they find such cream-skimming behaviors lucrative, and then can
exit the market frictionlessly whenever the opportunity for arbitrage van-
ishes, then the Pareto optimality or at least the second-best (Ramsey pric-
ing) result of the incumbent might be obtained.25
What has been going on in Korea’s international services market ever
since the liberalization ignited by the WTO agreement could be explained
in the jargon of this framework: homogeneity of service, frictionless entry
and exit, no universal service obligation (enabling cream-skimming by
SSPs), and price advantage of resellers over FSPs (see Lee 1998).
First, SSPs’ service is much like that of FSPs. To be sure, SSPs’ quality of
service might be somewhat inferior to that of FSPs because of multinetwork
interconnections or technical imperfections, especially in the case of voice
on Internet protocol (VoIP) services. However, at least users can achieve
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24. Resale of international call service is sometimes called international simple resale.
25. This paradigm was developed by such Bell Lab economists as Baumol, Panzer, and
Willig, implicitly against the Department of Justice’s intentions in the break-up of AT&T dur-
ing the mid-1970s. For more details on the theory, see Baumol, Panzer, and Willig (1982). Iron-
ically, AT&T was divested into long-distance AT&T and seven Regional Bell Operating Com-
panies in 1984, in accordance with the Modified Final Judgment in 1982.
their general purposes of communicating with foreign residents no matter
which services they may use. Even if quality matters, choices between tariﬀ
and quality are up to the users. This provides a foothold for SSPs to make
inroads into the FSPs’ realm. Second, SSPs’ frictionless entry and exit are
guaranteed institutionally. SSPs can easily enter the market through regis-
tration that meets the minimum requirements on financial capability and
technical personnel. In addition, SSPs can freely exit simply if the cus-
tomers’ rights are protected, whereas FSPs need authorization for both
entry and exit. Third, SSPs sometimes target specific groups of customers
through the marketing of pre- or postpaid cards, or by focusing only on
those countries with plenty of traﬃc trading (i.e., those that have no obli-
gation toward ubiquitous services such as FSPs).
Finally, SSPs have a price advantage over FSPs partly due to SSPs’ ca-
pacity for cost reduction, and partly because of the downward rigidity of
FSPs’ charges. The main drivers for the cost advantage are twofold. First,
SSPs incur relatively negligible sunk costs compared to FSPs because they
lease the dedicated lines and use the FSPs’ networks.26 Second, they are able
to minimize settlement payments to foreign partners by forwarding traﬃc
via the lease cost routes and thus bypassing the existing international trans-
mission facilities used by FSPs.
Reasons for the stickiness of FSPs’ charges could be found in both the
prior-tariﬀ-approval system and the FSPs’ collusive behavior. KT’s collec-
tion charges—that is, international tariﬀs—were lowered several times be-
tween 1993 and 1997 under the government’s prior-approval system (see
table 8.10); this was done with a view toward addressing the unfair practice
of cross-subsidizing the deficits of the local telephony sector, in which new
entrants’ charges had been set below KT’s with fixed proportions.
This leader-follower behavior in price diﬀerentials, in spite of its aboli-
tion in 1995, was maintained even when collection charges for major inter-
262 Nae-Chan Lee and Han-Young Lie
26. According to the legal definition, SSPs cannot possess their own facilities.
Table 8.10 Price Changes in Fixed Telephony Services of Korea Telecom (won per 3 minutes)
Feb. 10, July 1, Aug. 1, Jan. 1, Dec. 1, Dec. 1, Sept. 1, Feb. 16,
1993 1993 1994 1995 1995 1996 1997 1998
Local 30 — 40 — — 41.6 45 —
Long distance
Zone 1 100 30 40 — — 41.6 45 —
Zone 2 360 360 200 — — 183 172 —
Zone 3 675 675 313 — — 277 245 —
Internationala –7% — — –5% –7% –15% –12% 14%
Source: Korea Telecom.
aRate of change in average price.
national settlement-deficit countries (including, e.g., China) were raised in
February 1998 due to ever-worsening traﬃc imbalances and the devalua-
tion of the exchange rate.
Table 8.11 shows the collection charges of both KT and the leading SSP,
SK Telink (an aﬃliate of the leading mobile FSP, SK Telecom) to the three
major countries—the United States, China, and Japan—having the largest
volume of traﬃc with Korea.27 Note that SK Telink’s average charge per
minute for these countries is 39 percent lower than that of KT.28
Market Performance. At first glance the theory appears to go oﬀ the mark,
because no tariﬀ reductions of FSPs have occurred in a pure sense since re-
sellers first entered the market. However, evaluation of market performance
should occur in the context of enhancing the overall welfare via the widen-
ing varieties of choice and demand substitutions. Backed up by price ad-
vantages, SSPs have expanded their market shares at extraordinarily high
rates and have made inroads on the FSPs’ market, as evidenced by the
trends in outgoing traﬃc and revenues.
The outgoing traﬃc for FSPs has grown annually at the average rate of 18
percent from 1995 to 1998. The volume of outgoing traﬃc peaked in 1997
with 901 million minutes as a result of the boost in economic growth and in-
creases in trade, but it took a downward turn in 1998. Although there was
a decline in the FSPs’ traﬃc between the first half of 1998 and 1999, the
SSPs’ traﬃc continued to increase, showing definite evidence that users
were switching over from FSPs to SSPs. As of 1999, outgoing traﬃc during
the first half of the year accounted for 430 million minutes, whereas the
Korea’s Telecom Services Reform through Trade Negotiations 263




First Additional First Additional
Minute Minutes Minute Minutes Standard Discount
United States 14.0 10.5 9.8 7.4 4.8 4.4
China 16.4 12.3 11.5 8.6 6.5 5.9
Japan 24.8 18.6 17.4 13.1 13.0 11.7
Source: Korea Telecom, SK Telink.
27. Note that both providers’ charges are billed per second on a usage base and discounted
for oﬀ-peak hours, but that KT’s charges diﬀerentiate between the first minute and additional
minutes.
28. Average charge per minute for each country is calculated as follows: (a) average standard
and discount charges, based on four minutes of use, are calculated separately, and (b) they are
weighted by standard and discount hours. Then, each country’s average charge is weighted by
the corresponding share of outgoing KT traﬃc in 1999.
traﬃc share for SSPs amounted to 21 percent, compared to 0.95 percent in
the first half of 1998 (see fig. 8.4).
Regarding revenues (see table 8.12), FSPs recorded 753.0 billion won in
1996, but since then the revenue had been reduced to around 82 percent an-
nually, on average. In contrast, revenues for SSPs have increased from 42.6
billion won in 1998 to 130.0 billion won in 1999. The total decreased in 1998
but by 1999 had fully recuperated above its 1997 level, thanks to the recov-
ery of the economy and market liberalization. In addition, the SSPs’ market
share had increased from 6.7 percent in 1998 to 18.3 percent in 1999. The net
benefits of customers’ switching to SSPs from the time of the start-up of re-
sale to June 1999 are estimated to be worth 52.46 billion won, on the as-
sumption that there is a complete substitution of the FSPs’ market by SSPs.29
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Fig. 8.4 Outgoing traﬃc of FSPs and SSPs (millions of minutes)
Sources: Evaluation of Competitiveness in Facility-based Telecommunication Services Market
(1999, 2000), the Korea Information Society Development Institute, and international FSPs
Table 8.12 Revenues of FSPs and SSPs
Revenue 1996 1997 1998 1999
FSPs (%) 753.0 658.0 593.1 580.5
(93.3) (81.7)
SSPs (%) — — 42.6 130.0
(6.7) (18.3)
Total (billions of won) 753.0 658.0 635.7 710.5
Source: Computer and Communication Promotion Association of Korea.
Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate revenue shares between FSPs and SSPs.
29. Average charges per minute of KT and SK TelLink are used as proxies for FSPs and
SSPs, respectively, and calculated in the same way as discussed in note 27.
In response to SSPs’ elongation, international FSPs have participated in
the international simple resale business and have taken on strategies that
diﬀerentiate classes of customers by introducing new discount-option pric-
ing packages composed of flat-rate and usage-based charges to retain heavy
users.
In sum, the introduction of voice resale services has facilitated the con-
testability of international telecommunication services, and consumers
have become the biggest beneficiaries.
Bottleneck in Further Deployment. FSPs’ networks are indispensable facili-
ties for SSPs to provide service to an unspecified number of the general
public. Most SSPs have provided services mainly through mobile FSPs’
networks; KT’s PSTN is rarely used. The reason for this can be found in
KT’s peculiar interconnection arrangement. Whereas interconnection ar-
rangements between FSPs are under the control of the government, those
between FSPs and SSPs are left to the parties’ own voluntary negotiations.
KT had taken a stance of treating SSPs as customers rather than providers
and charged user fees higher than interconnection charges available to
FSPs with no service of billing. This arrangement inevitably raises costs for
SSPs and thus causes a serious bottleneck for FSPs’ access to the fixed-line
subscribers of KT and for market expansion, although there might be pros
and cons in facility-based versus service-based competitions.
Competition in the Incoming-Traﬃc Market: 
Dismantling the International Settlement Regime
Existing International Settlement Regime. Although competition in the do-
mestic outgoing-traﬃc market is a matter of marketing among service pro-
viders, the generation of incoming traﬃc is irrelevant to domestic compe-
tition. Nevertheless, service providers compete with each other to get as
much incoming traﬃc as possible because it can yield settlement revenue as
remuneration for forwarding calls to the domestic receiving party and for
providing facilities.30
Although SSPs have been free to arrange settlement methods, a stereo-
typed international settlement arrangement has recently been applied to
FSPs. An overview of the regime is as follows. International FSPs pay settle-
ment rates to their foreign-counterpart FSPs for utilizing their networks
when forwarding calls to the receiving party. FSPs first negotiate the ac-
counting rate and then usually split it evenly to determine the settlement
rate, which requires outgoing-traﬃc-excessive FSPs to settle payments with
incoming-traﬃc-excessive FSPs. However, this system has caused a conflict
of interest between developed countries, whose outgoing traﬃc dominates
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30. International FSPs regard a deficit in international settlement as a cost driver. Usually,
collection charges for deficit countries are higher than those for surplus countries.
incoming traﬃc, and developing countries, which are in the opposite situa-
tion. The developed countries have urged developing countries to reduce
existing accounting rates based on costs, in order to hold down a burden of
deficits. Yet developing countries have tenaciously resisted such a proposal
because the settlement surplus is a major financial resource for expanding
infrastructures and subsidizing universal service.
The possible remedies for this malfunctioning have developed in two di-
rections. One is to commit binding benchmarking to heuristically acceler-
ate the realization of cost-oriented settlement rates, and the other is to cre-
ate an environment receptive of such alternative means as international
simple resale to work as a source of market pressure against the ancient
regime. The International Telecommunications Union (ITU), on a multi-
lateral basis, and the United States’ Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) have independently promoted the first of these directions and issued
benchmarks for settlement rates in 1997 and 1999, respectively (see tables
8.13 and 8.14). Korea belongs to class F and the upper-middle-income
group, respectively.31
WTO negotiations have played a major role in implementing the other di-
rection. The liberalization of resale markets of WTO member countries
should be interpreted in this context.
When the presence of SSPs was negligible or resale itself was prohibited,
the main focus was on how to protect new domestic entrants from the whip-
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Table 8.13 ITU’s Recommendatino (by year-end 2001)a
Teledensity
T  1 1  T  5 5  T  10 10  T  20 20  T 35 35  T 50 T  50
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
0.327 SDR 0.251 SDR 0.210 SDR 0.162 SDR 0.118 SDR 0.088 SDR 0.043 SDR
Source: ITU.
a1 SDR is equivalent to $1.320999, as of June 2000.
Table 8.14 FCC’s Benchmarks and Transitional Period
Low Lower Middle Upper Middle High 
Income Income Income Income
Teledensity  1 ($726) ($726 to 2,895) ($2,896 to 8,995) ($8,956 or more)
$0.23 $0.23 $0.19 $0.19 $0.15
January 2003 January 2002 January 2001 January 2000 January 1999
Source: FCC.
31. Note that the FCC’s benchmarks are those for U.S. partner countries only. Korea ex-
tended one year for the fulfillment of the benchmark.
sawing of foreign monopolists in international settlements with foreign
FSPs. In most countries, the government or regulatory body has arranged
competitive safeguards against whipsawing through the uniformity of ac-
counting rate, which sets the rate level equally across domestic FSPs, and for
the proportionate return principle, which distributes incoming traﬃc among
domestic FSPs in proportion to outgoing-traﬃc ratios.
Converging to Laissez-faire. As incoming traﬃc for SSPs has increased, reg-
ulatory bodies have become focused on preventing the so-called one-way
bypass, an unfair practice in which FSPs rerout calls via foreign SSPs in or-
der to reduce international settlement expenditures to counterparts. Coun-
tries such as the United States, Japan, and Korea have reinforced their mon-
itoring functions.
Contests for incoming traﬃc have been started on the spot market among
SSPs in Korea, resulting in declines in interconnection charges.32 Their total
traﬃc has substituted for part of would-be FSP traﬃc, distressing the FSPs’
settlement revenue despite participating in the SSPs’ competition games.
In mid-1999, the Korean government relaxed the existing regulation for
FSPs to negotiate a settlement arrangement freely with developed countries
in which markets are so competitive that, to a certain degree there is no
fear of whipsawing. Currently, in Korea, there are ongoing discussions con-
cerning issues such as the further deregulation of the FSPs’ settlement re-
gime and the shift of KT’s access arrangement with SSPs to the inter-
connection regime, striking a balance with measures for FSPs. Figure 8.5
shows the competition between SSPs and FSPs in the international service
market.
8.4.2 Mitigation of Foreign Ownership and 
Growth of the Mobile Services Market
Korea’s rapid economic growth over the last two decades has been
achieved mostly by the export-centric industrial policy, pushed by the Ko-
rean government (see Lee and Lim 1999). The government financed prime-
interest-rate loans to target industries through government-controlled fi-
nancial institutions so as to allocate scarce financial resources eﬀectively,
which resulted in the birth of large conglomerates—so-called chaebol.
Owner-managers and families of chaebol exercised exclusive power in man-
agerial decision making as well as controlling subsidiaries. However, as the
stock market became an alternative source of external financing for chae-
bol, these owners adhered to the right of management through family own-
ership of equities and cross-shareholdings among subsidiaries. After all,
ownership and management of chaebol did not remain separated, and as a
Korea’s Telecom Services Reform through Trade Negotiations 267










































result, managerial eﬃciency could not be checked through the external
stock market or internal institutions. In a sense, the concentration of capi-
tal and ownership provided momentum at a time when the Korean econ-
omy was about to take oﬀ. As economy grew, however, this peculiar corpo-
rate governance system in Korea blocked the monitoring function of the
capital market and was regarded as one of the major factors that led the
economy into the financial crisis between 1997 and 1998. Since then, eﬀorts
at regulatory reforms have been to make corporate information and ac-
countability transparent; to strengthen internal monitoring systems such as
boards of directors and market disciplines; to mitigate foreign ownership;
and so forth. Such measures are expected to accelerate the metamorphosis
of the chaebol’s management system, which in turn will materialize as an
eﬀectively competitive structure and promote economic growth.
Until recently, foreign ownership has long been restrained by the govern-
ment because of the concern that foreign ownership might not only erode
the domestic capital market but also deprive domestic corporations of the
right of management. Relics of protectionism, however, have been replaced
by the more positive notion that foreign ownership could play a significant
role in diluting the concentrated ownership of chaebol and in securing fund-
ing resources. The latter has been highlighted during the period of the fi-
nancial crisis when the Korean economy was in need of investment funding
and foreign currency for recovery. Figure 8.6 summarizes the main points in
the mitigation of limitations on foreign ownership.
The telecommunication services market moved ahead of other heavy in-
dustries in liberalization and opening even before the onset of financial cri-
sis. As explained in section 8.2, deregulation of foreign ownership kept face
with trade negotiations on telecommunication services, including an au-
tonomous lift. Foreign investors, mainly the major telecommunication ser-
vice providers of developed countries with abundant experience and skills
at home focused mostly on the ever-flourishing mobile-service market in
Korea, where the three FSPs are subsidiaries of chaebol.
At the second stage of the regulatory reform initiated by the UR, there
were two cellular FSPs: one was SK Telecom, and the other, Shinsegi Tele-
com. SK Telecom, starting up as an aﬃliate of KT (then, Korea Mobile
Telecommunication) in 1984, was sold to the SK Group, now one of the
biggest four chaebol, in 1994, whereas POSCO, the public iron and steel cor-
poration, was a major stakeholder of Shinsegi Telecom.
As of 1997, foreign investors began to take serious interest in Korean
telecommunications companies. SBC and AirTouch owned about 18 per-
cent of Shinsegi Telecom’s stocks, whereas TEI possessed 6.5 percent of SK
Telecom’s shares. Although it appears that TEI aimed at realizing stock div-
idends rather than at participating in management, Shinsegi Telecom at
least could raise funds from outside to compete with SK Telecom.
The mitigation of foreign ownership limitations was more influential at


























the third stage of the implementation of the WTO agreement on basic tele-
communications. The two late entrants into the FSP market, LG Telecom
and Hansol M.Com, aﬃliates of chaebol, have operated their businesses
in earnest since early 1998 and have been in need of financial resources
to extend coverage and to attract customers to catch up with the front-
runners. To make matters worse, this period overlapped with the financial
crisis. Under the circumstances, foreign investment provided a source 
of external funding to PCS providers in return for the concession of some
rights to management. This was an opportunity not only to improve their
corporate governance system (e.g., through rational decision making on
investments) but also to develop the mobile services market, as introduced
in section 8.2. As of 1998, BT became a major shareholder of LG Telecom
with 24 percent of its stock, whereas BCI and AIG invested in Hansol
M.Com and own 9.8 and 6.5 percent of their equities, respectively. Table
8.15 summarizes the foreign ownership structures discussed here.
Foreign investment in the telecommunication markets also had a positive
eﬀect on the growth of other industries, in particular, the equipment indus-
try. Table 8.16 shows the amount of investment that mobile FSPs spent on
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Table 8.15 Foreign Ownership Structure of Mobile FSPs and Korea Telecom
Major Foreign Investors
FSP 1997 1998 1999
Korea Telecom — — Foreign DR (14.4%)
SK Telecom TEI Fund (6.5%) TEI Fund (6.5%), TEI Fund (4.4%), 
City Bank ADR (10.31%) ADR (20.3%)
Shinsegi Telecom Airtouch (10.7%), AirTouch (10.6%) AirTouch (11.4%), 
SBC (7.8%) SBC (7.8%) SBC (6.5%)
KT Freetel Motorolar (2.8%) Motorolar (2.7%) Microsoft, etc. (7.05%), 
Motorolar (1.95%)
LG Telecom — BT (23.5%) BT (24.1%)
Hansol M.Com — BCI (9.8%), BCI (20.97%),
AIG (6.5%) AIG (13.98%)
Sources: FSPs.
Table 8.16 Mobile FSPs’ Investment (billions of won)
1998 1999
SK Telecom 865 1,460
Shinsegi Telecom 364 483
KT Freetel 511 689
LG Telecom 594 443
Hansol M.Com 592 645
Total 2,926 3,720
Source: Mobile FSPs.
the expansion of networks, including the procurement of switches and base
stations.
As of 1998, their investment reached 2,926 billion won in total and in-
creased to 21 percent (3,720 won) in 1999. The far-reaching eﬀect of foreign
investment on the value-added production of related industries can be
roughly estimated by using table 8.16 with interindustry and fixed capital
formation tables based on an input-output analysis issued by the Bank of
Korea (BOK).33 The estimated values of foreign investments are 417 billion
won in 1998 and 713 billion won the following year.
The mitigation of foreign ownership limitations also provided a good op-
portunity for the government to issue foreign DR, and hence, to accelerate
the separation of policy and management functions of the government.
8.5 Concluding Remarks
Regulatory reform of Korea’s telecommunication services market has
been gradually pushed through a series of trade negotiations in two direc-
tions: one is to lower entry barriers such as classification systems and li-
censing processes, and the other is to lift foreign ownership limitations. The
trade negotiations that had the most impact on the direction of the telecom-
munications market were the WTO negotiations on basic telecommunica-
tions. Korea introduced voice resale services and mitigated foreign owner-
ship limitations, which were autonomously lifted further in order to attract
foreign capital during the economic slump. The inflow of foreign capital
had a positive impact on international and mobile service markets. SSPs
made inroads primarily on high-profit sectors such as international service,
which accounted for about 18 percent of the total minutes of outgoing
traﬃc after less than a year since the beginning of business. As a result,
competition in the incoming-traﬃc market among SSPs and FSPs pushed
for decreases in accounting rates and reformed the existing domestic-
international settlement regime. However, issues surrounding the deregula-
tion of SSPs’ access to fixed networks and how to strike a balance in the in-
ternational settlement arrangement with FSPs are under discussion, and
are expected to materialize within year 2000.
The Korean government in a sense took trade negotiations as an oppor-
tunity to eﬀectively manage domestic pressure against market opening. The
market regulatory reform provoked conflicts of interest between incumbent
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33. First, the industry-specific amount of foreign investment is calculated on the assumption
that (a) shares of foreign investment in total investment of mobile FSPs are proportionate with
shares of equities and (b) proportions of mobile FSPs’ investment distributed across related in-
dustries are equivalent to those of telecommunications in general and deflated by the constant
wholesale price index in 1995. Second, the industry-specific amount of value-added is ob-
tained by multiplying the ratio of the value-added I-O coeﬃcient and the industry-specific
amount of foreign investment in real terms, which is summed over related industries. For more
details on the analytic scheme, see Hong (1999).
FSPs and late-coming SSPs in the international-services market. However,
the ultimate beneficiaries of market liberalization were the consumers, in
that they received tariﬀ reductions and a wider scope of choices.
Foreign participation not only provided financial resources to late mo-
bile-FSP entrants, but also contributed to rebuilding their ineﬃcient cor-
porate governance systems. As a result, there was unprecedented growth in
the mobile-services market, which influenced the equipment industry in
turn.
It might not be easy to provide a clear-cut decomposition of Korea’s lib-
eralization regarding the motivations and decisions within Korea, the
WTO agreement, and the financial crisis. In the context of market access,
WTO negotiations in the UR and Group on Basic Telecom were crucial to
the process of Korea’s market liberalization. In a sense, however, liberaliza-
tion could be driven by the government’s firm will that competition eventu-
ally would be beneficial to consumer welfare. One thorny issue was the po-
litical consideration of national sovereignty over telecom networks, as is
often the case in developing countries. The phased-in opening of Korea’s
telecom market could be interpreted as a compromise between economic
and political considerations. The financial crisis to some extent played a
role, in the sense that Korea implemented its scheduled WTO commitments
on foreign ownership eighteen months earlier than originally planned.
In regard to regulatory principles—the so-called, Reference Paper—Ko-
rea had no problem making commitments to the WTO because its regula-
tory framework has undergone progressive reform since 1990. In addition,
it was by Korea’s own eﬀorts that improvements were made to the regula-
tory framework.
At an initial stage, foreign entry depends on each country’s legal system
of licensing processes and equity ownership. Once de facto entry is accom-
plished through either suﬃcient capital investment or the establishment of
on-the-spot corporations, the performance of market liberalization and
openness depends on two factors. One belongs to the commercial sphere:
the availability of funds necessary for facility investment, market prospects,
and the climate of business transactions. The other factor belongs to the
solidity of competitive safeguards to guarantee fair competition among
service providers, including foreign new entrants: rights of way, access to
sea-cable landing stations, interconnection, local loop unbundling with
collocation, universal service, and so forth.
While the former factor is a matter of the strategies by service providers,
the latter is that of the regulatory regime, which in turn implies that issues
of competitive safeguards are no longer confined to the domestic area. Al-
though trade negotiations in the past focused mainly on pulling down for-
eign entry barriers, those in the future are expected to go forward to details
of competitive safeguards as well as further mitigation of entry barriers. In
particular, further works on competitive safeguards would have to set forth
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how these principles should be applied in practice. The reason is that com-
petitive safeguards designed in the previous multilateral trade negotiations
are understandably high-level and general enough to accommodate the
broad range of diﬀerent political and legal frameworks among various
countries. However, multilateral forums such as the New Round negotia-
tions might not be an appropriate venue for tentatively developing a more
complicated set of principles on competitive safeguards. Apparently, an im-
plicit consensus on their role in the previous WTO negotiations has been to
ensure a target outcome—i.e., to level the playing field in the telecommuni-
cation services market, not to provide specific tools whereby those out-
comes would be eﬀectively achieved. It would be desirable that bilateral or
nonbinding multilateral setting are dedicated over a certain period of time
for the sake of building up an understanding and necessity of furthering
suﬃciently detailed guidelines for competitive safeguards. A better and
plausible choice for the New Round negotiations in the telecommunication-
services sector is to outline an exemplary list of good and bad practices for
each regulatory principle already entered into agreement.
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Comment Ramonette B. Serafica
Lee and Lie provide an interesting and insightful discussion of the various
stages of market restructuring that Korea’s telecom sector has undergone.
This is spiced up with a fascinating account of the changing trends in call-
ing patterns or habits as well as of the rise and death of the diﬀerent services.
The paper not only presents a good discussion of the transformation of
the market but also gives concrete evidence of the benefits arising from the
more liberal rules on market entry and foreign ownership that resulted from
the trade negotiations.
The gains identified in the paper are consistent with what free-market ad-
vocates envision. Along with tariﬀ reductions there is now a wider scope of
choices available to the consumers along with innovative services, pricing
schemes, and technologies.
Another identified gain deals with the role of foreign participation. The
fundamental role of the telecommunications sector in building the compet-
itiveness of other sectors of the economy is widely recognized. It is also a
prerequisite for international trade in services. However, building the nec-
essary infrastructure and gaining the needed expertise requires a lot of re-
sources, and thus what is at stake in these trade negotiations is really the
capacity for most countries to mobilize the investment needed.
For the Korean telecom market, foreign participation addressed the need
for additional financial resources particularly at a time when domestic re-
sources were tight. With the aid of foreign investment, latecomers in the
mobile market, for example, were able to catch up and attract new cus-
tomers by expanding their service coverage. Moreover, the paper mentions
that foreign participation has also led to the reform of insuﬃcient corporate
governance systems, although specifics with respect to telecommunications
firms (e.g., by way of anecdotal evidence) were not given.
Finally, reforms in the sector also created positive by-products as the
brisk market activity in telecom services spurred growth in the upstream
equipment industry.
In total, the authors weave an interesting and compelling story of the lib-
eralization of Korea’s telecom services market and of the gains that it has
Korea’s Telecom Services Reform through Trade Negotiations 275
Ramonette B. Serafica is associate professor of economics at De La Salle University,
Manila.
generated. The story, however, focuses on market access concerns, treating
an important part of regulatory reform that has to do with procompetitive
regulation in less detail. This aspect is critical, especially for the telecom
sector, because of its history of monopoly regulation.
Using the traditional Industrial Organization (IO) paradigm, the paper’s
emphasis is on reforms in market structure and eﬀects on market perfor-
mance but leaves out the part on market conduct or the rules that govern it,
which also aﬀect market outcomes.
The need to have both for successful liberalization is evident in the World
Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Basic Telecommunications Ser-
vices, which in fact has two main parts: one is a schedule of commitments
with respect to market access and the other is a set of procompetitive regu-
latory principles.
Individual countries provided detailed schedules on the telecom services
to be included, on the scope of commitments, and on the degree of permit-
ted market access. Another significant outcome of the negotiations, how-
ever, was the adoption of a procompetitive set of regulatory principles
(known as the Reference Paper) covering a range of issues, including anti-
competitive practices, interconnection with the major supplier, and regula-
tory independence and transparency.
A discussion of asymmetric regulation in favor of new players, whether
currently in place in Korea or not, and to what extent these have been in-
troduced in conjunction with market access reforms, will be very useful for
guiding regulation elsewhere. As an outsider, I would be interested in know-
ing how the market was opened, to how many players, and to whom; but
equally important to understand and appreciate are the rules imposed or re-
laxed to assist new players. Other interesting questions about aspects of the
reform process can be asked as well. What sorts of problems are the new en-
trants facing vis-à-vis the dominant incumbent? Which among these prob-
lems or disadvantages are structural in nature and which are behavioral?
Finally, how has the government responded—either proactively or reac-
tively—to ensure that market access reforms are complemented with regu-
lations that assist new entrants?
The need to have both market access and a procompetitive regulatory
environment for successful liberalization cannot be stressed enough.
A case in point is the Philippines (see Serafica 2000). Market liberaliza-
tion in telecoms was introduced in the country before the WTO negotia-
tions on market access for basic telecommunications. Even after the WTO,
however, adherence to procompetitive principles remains weak. The previ-
ous government eﬀectively demonopolized the industry and competition
was introduced even at the local exchange level as early as 1993. Right now
we have about ten major facilities-based operators, although industry con-
solidation is taking place. Thus, by the time of the WTO negotiations on ba-
sic telecommunications, the Philippines’ response to the negotiations was a
schedule of specific commitments based on preexisting policies.
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The foreign-ownership limit was set at 40 percent because the Philippines’
constitution sets a 40 percent limit on foreign equity in public utilities. Market
access was restricted to the provision of services on a facilities basis, with no
resale of leased lines, and call-back schemes were not permitted in accordance
with our Telecommunications Policy Act of 1995. Although the Philippine
commitment acknowledges the objectives of liberalization as embodied in the
WTO agreement in broad terms, specific support mechanisms are still lacking.
Sadly, nearly a decade after market liberalization, we still do not have
procompetitive rules (e.g., with respect to access to essential facilities of the
dominant operator—or major supplier, in WTO parlance).
As we have experienced, lack of support for new entrants in the post-
“liberalization” setting threatens the very survival of competition. More-
over, it leads to wasteful duplication of facilities or investments made by
both the carriers and subscribers, as well as to a lower grade of service as sub-
scribers get caught in the games played by the operators. As such, despite the
fact that Filipinos, like the Koreans, have more choices and to some extent
lower prices, the full benefits of liberalization have yet to be enjoyed.
Thus, I think policy researchers and other readers can benefit from a bal-
anced discussion or treatment of the reforms in market access and similar
adjustments with respect to the procompetitive regulation that Korea’s tele-
com sector has experienced or will need as part of the overall regulatory
process. For in the long run, it is the adherence to procompetitive regulation
that will determine whether the story of market liberalization in telecoms
will end on a sad or happy note.
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Comment Chayun Tantivasadakarn
This comment concentrates on four main points:
1. General comments
2. The lesson learned from Korea’s telecommunication reform
3. The possibility of using Korea’s experience as a model to facilitate re-
forms in other developing countries
4. Clarifications and suggestions
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General Comments
In general, this is a well-written paper. It provides readers with not only
a systematic chronicle of Korea’s telecommunications policy reform but
also gives clear explanatory factors behind the change of policy in each
stage of reform. The paper also tries to assess the impact of telecommuni-
cations on the market structure, industry performance, and foreign owner-
ship. The arguments presented in the paper are well supported with statis-
tics, diagrams, and systematic explanations.
Korea’s Lessons
The paper shows that telecommunications reform in Korea has been
stimulated by a series of trade negotiations beginning in 1989, with pressure
from the United States, then from the Uruguay Round. This, in turn, was
followed by World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations on basic tele-
communications. The Asian financial crisis in 1997 generated the final wave
of policy changes.
The Korean government took these pressures and turned them into op-
portunities to maintain the direction of the reform and to keep the mo-
mentum going. The reform strategies followed a set of instructions:
1. At the early stage of reform, open up only the sector that is really pres-
sured by the trade partner. For instance, the value-added services were
opened first in the first stage reform.
2. Introduce competition to the local service providers gradually. This
process began with an introduction of the second service provider. The
government then used the managed competition policy to maintain the
excessive profits for the service providers. This policy definitely generated
negative impacts on consumer welfare; however, the policy probably fa-
cilitated fund raising for further investment of the incumbent firm. The
managed competition was maintained throughout the first and second
stages.
3. Introduce full competition later. For instance, in 1997 the government
issued licenses to twenty-seven new service providers. The policy was also
intended to saturate the market with as many local service providers as pos-
sible before the market was opened to international competition.
4. Complement the third strategy by utilizing voice-resale services that
serve as a tool to stimulate the contestability of international telecommunica-
tion services.
5. Relax foreign-ownership limitations gradually in the sectors deemed
sensitive. For instance, foreign ownership in the wired line services was not
allowed in the first and second stages of reform; however, foreign ownership
was increased to 33 percent in the third stage and to 49 percent after 1999. 
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Can Other Developing Countries Copy the Korean Model?
First, Korea’s entire telecommunications reform took more than ten
years after a very good start. The liberalization process had begun quite
early: in 1989, after the basic need for wired lines had been satisfied. The lo-
cal monopolist was exposed to competition gradually—initially to compe-
tition from private domestic providers, and then to that from foreign firms.
This long period of adjustment allowed suﬃcient time for the incumbent
public enterprises and private domestic providers to build up strength to
compete with more eﬃcient foreign operators.
Unfortunately, all lower-middle-income countries are still struggling just
to satisfy their wired line needs. According to International Telecommuni-
cation Union (ITU; 1999) statistics, the average teledensity rate in 1998 for
lower income countries was only 8.18 lines per 100 inhabitants. Besides,
these countries still have other socioeconomic and political problems that
may have higher priority on their government agenda.
Second, the strong will and serious actions of the Korean government
were the major driving factors behind the readiness of its domestic service
providers for international competition. Such governmental behavior is
rare among the developing countries.
As a result, the answer to “Can other countries copy the Korean model?”
is probably no. With the pressures of the WTO negotiations on basic tele-
communications and the upcoming New Round, the developing countries
do not seem to have the necessary conditions and suﬃcient time to adjust.
Clarification and Suggestions for the Paper
First, it is unclear which government institutions are actually responsible
for the determination to carry out the reform policy. Some description of
these institutions and their functions should be added to the paper. This will
provide very valuable lessons for other countries.
Second, the author has mentioned that in 1995 (in the second stage of re-
form) the government was considering the introduction of a price-cap sys-
tem. Economists consider the price cap to be a system that improves price
flexibility in an increasingly competitive market while protecting against
cross-subsidization, monopoly, and predatory pricing (see Mitchell and Vo-
gelsang 1991). The price-cap system is a very eﬃcient way to ensure that
consumers will benefit from the technological progress and the rent from
natural monopoly. However, it is unclear in the paper whether it has been
implemented, and if it has been, what the result was.
Third, it is possible that the reduction in revenue from the international
calls mentioned in the paper was partially caused by new technology, such
as the Internet phone, which allows international calls from personal com-
puters (PCs) to other PCs or from PCs to normal telephones at very low
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costs or even for free.1 In fact, this technology will open up an entirely new
area of competition to the local service providers.
Fourth, as we know, free trade will generate gains from trade. Some well-
known sources of gains are gains from comparative advantage, procompet-
itive gains, gains from product and input varieties, and gains from average
cost reductions due to economies of scale (see Markusen et al. 1995). The
paper has shown to some extent the evidence of procompetitive gains due
to international competition and gains from the increase of product and in-
put varieties. It might be interesting to explore whether there is any evidence
of gains from reduction of average costs because the technology in this sec-
tor is generally subject to economies of scale.
Fifth, setting aside the overall benefits of free trade for a country, free
trade never guarantees that everyone in the country must also gain. Hence
some form of compensation to the loser is needed. In the case of Korea’s
telecommunication, Korea Telecom (KT) seems to be the loser, at least at
the beginning of the reform process. It would be very interesting to know
how KT has been aﬀected by the reform and how Korean government has
managed the resistance and political pressure.
Finally, International comparison of the Korean comparative advantage
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1. For example, [http://www.dialpad.com] provides such free international calls for any des-
tination in the United States.
Table 8C.1 Comparative Advantage Index of the Telecommunication Sector:
Selected Asia-Pacific Countries
Relative Main Lines Relative Revenue 
per Employee per Employee
1991 1996 1991 1996
Malaysia 0.86 1.05 0.72 0.91
The Philippines 0.50 0.75 0.66 0.59
Thailand 0.85 0.98 1.00 0.64
All lower income 0.28 0.61 0.18 0.28
Hong Kong 2.34 0.65 2.93 1.31
South Korea 3.43 2.25 2.01 1.29
Singapore 1.53 1.71 2.58 3.92
Upper income 2.82 2.60 2.09 1.44
Australia — — — 1.65
Japan 2.88 2.11 3.52 4.16
Developed 2.48 1.83 3.06 3.49
Asia-Pacific 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Source: Reprinted from Tantivasadakam (1999).
Notes: Calculated from ITU (1999) data. Relative main lines per employee of country i = main
lines per employee of country i divided by the main lines per employee of the Asia-Pacific re-
gion. Relative revenue per employee of country i = revenue per employee of country i divided
by the revenue per employee of the Asia-Pacific region.
might be something the author should consider to incorporate in the paper.
One possible index might be the relative main lines per employee and rela-
tive revenue per employee, as in table 8C.1.
The indexes in the table capture the ability of one country’s telecommu-
nications employees to handle telecommunications facilities and generate
revenue relative to the average ability of the region. The table shows that
Korea’s indexes for the relative main lines per employee were one of the best
in both 1991 and 1996. Similarly, its indexes for the relative revenue per em-
ployee were quite high for the same period. More details and similar indexes
for each telecommunications facility should be calculated for the periods
prior to and after the start of telecommunications reform. The index then
can be used to show the impact of the reform on the comparative advantage
of Korea’s telecommunications sector.
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